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I. INTRODUCTION
This note is the second part of a two-part publication that introduces
and critically evaluates Brazilian private equity market. Over the past ten
years, Brazil’s private equity market has expanded rapidly and appears
poised to grow even more in the future.1 A basic understanding on the
players, regulators, and laws that define the Brazilian market is important
for any private equity practitioner. Part I of my publication titled Private
Equity in Brazil: Industry Overview and Regulatory Environment2 introduced the private equity industry in Brazil. In that note, I discussed Brazil’s main regulators, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “CVM”), and three self-regulators: the Brazilian Association of Entities in the Financial and Capital Markets (Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais, or “ANBIMA”); The
Brazilian Association of Private Equity and Venture Capital (Associação
Brasileira de Private Equity e Venture Capital or “ABVCAP); and
BM&FBOVESPA, the São Paulo Stock Exchange. I also analyzed the
regulations governing a private equity investment vehicle over the lifetime
of a private equity investment. Notably, Brazil has taken a relatively,
“hands off” approach to private equity regulation.3 This second note, Part
* The Author would like to thank the staff of the Michigan Journal of Private
Equity and Venture Capital Law for their invaluable assistance in preparing this note.
1. Key to this increased private equity activity was Brazil’s ability to: (1) promote
macroeconomic stability by reigning in inflation; (2) the government’s overt encouragement
of private equity funds through the creation of the FIP (Fundos de Investimento em Participações) investment form; (3) the reduction in capital gains taxes associated with private
equity investments; and (4) the changes in regulatory policies that allowed Brazilian pension
funds to invest directly in private equity investment vehicles. Shannon Guy, Note, Private
Equity in Brazil: Industry Overview and Regulatory Environment, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 155, 158-160 (2012) [hereinafter Private Equity in Brazil].
2. Id.
3. In general, Brazil has encouraged investment in private equity vehicles by allowing
vehicles to organize as a limited partnership under the laws of another country (typically the
U.S. and under the laws of Delaware), and by creating a special type of private equity investment vehicle—the FIP—with tax benefits substantially similar to the limited partnership
form enjoyed in the United States. I found that the Brazilian Government has successfully
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II of my two-part publication builds on my earlier analysis by addressing
the policy questions raised by Brazil’s regulatory regime. This note also
provides a critique of Brazil’s current policy and practices for regulating its
private equity market.
In this note, I explore some of the policy questions affecting Brazil’s
private equity industry that the country must tackle. In Part II, Section A,
I begin by asking the threshold question of whether the Brazilian government should play an active role in encouraging the growth of the private
equity industry. I resolve that Brazil should play an active role in encouraging the industry’s growth to encourage several possible benefits to the
real economy. Private equity may benefit the economy by providing job
growth and job preservation, improved access to credit for firms that
would not otherwise have funds, and improved access to talented managers. Further, private equity may be an effective screening mechanisms for
selecting good companies. In Part II, Section B, I ask whether Brazil has
successfully encouraged the growth of the private equity industry, or has
set policies that stifle its growth. By applying Ribeiro et al.’s “supply” and
“demand” factors, which lead to private equity growth in the Brazilian
context, I conclude that Brazil has done a commendable job creating a
regulatory environment that bolsters the growth of the private equity industry, but that lowering interest rates and the costs associated with starting a business would help the industry to expand further. In Part III,
Section C, I ask whether the Brazilian government should play an active
role in regulating its nascent private equity industry, and conclude that
Brazil should proactively regulate the industry, in certain areas, because
the benefits of good governance outweigh the costs associated with added
regulatory compliance. In Section D, I ask which actors are best suited to
create and enforce private equity regulations—government agencies or
self-regulating agencies. I conclude that the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission does not, at present, provide sufficient oversight of
the private equity industry, and that the self-regulatory agencies, like
ANBIMA, ABVCAP, and BM&FBOVESPA cannot adequately enforce
their own regulations due to conflicts of interest.
In Part III, I critique Brazil’s current regulatory policies. I ask which
risks Brazilian regulators should focus on mitigating, and try to assess their
encouraged private equity investment through FIPs, but the FMIEE, an investment vehicle
for venture capital, has been less successful. Given the importance of venture capital to market dynamism and prosperity, I recommend that Brazil reassess the incentives it provides to
the FMIEE fund structure. I also found that Brazil has effectuated the necessary investor
protections to encourage investment in portfolio companies, noting that investors need to
rely on arbitration as opposed to the Brazilian courts to enforce their rights. Accordingly, I
recommended that Brazil improve its legal system’s efficiency and predictability to encourage more investment. I found that the regulations related to management of the private
equity investment are sparse and limited to the requirement to disclose information related
to the companies’ financial position. Finally, I found that Brazil has laid the regulatory
groundwork to encourage viable exit opportunities by allowing companies to pick and choose
their ideal level of corporate governance using the São Paulo Stock Exchange’s Novo Mercado model. Id.
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effectiveness at regulating each risk. In eight sections, I explore different
risks that a robust private equity industry could pose for Brazil: (1) increased leverage in the capital markets, (2) market abuse problems, (3)
conflicts of interest, (4) transparency risks, (5) overall market efficiency
risks, (6) market access risks, (7) systemic risk to capital markets, and (8)
risks for qualified investors. I conclude that of these risks, Brazilian regulators should focus primarily on market-abuse risks, conflicts of interest,
and transparency issues, and that, at present increased regulation for the
other enumerated risks is either unnecessary or impractical.
Part IV Concludes.
II. REGULATORY POLICY QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This section explores policy questions raised by the private equity industry in Brazil. In four sections, I ask (1) whether the government should
seek to build up the private equity industry, (2) whether governmental
policies have fostered growth effectively, (3) whether the government
should actively regulate the industry, and (4) whether the government or
self-regulating entities are better poised to set and enforce regulations. I
make four conclusions. First, Brazil should encourage the growth of the
private equity industry. Second, while Brazil has set the groundwork for a
private equity industry to grow, it must take additional steps, like cutting
interest rates, to ensure continued growth. Third, Brazil should actively
regulate its nascent private equity industry. Lastly, neither governmental
regulators nor self-regulatory organizations are presently adequate to set
and enforce industry regulations in Brazil.
A. Should Brazil actively foster the growth
of the private equity industry?
The Brazilian Governments should play an active role in fostering the
development of a robust private equity industry, including developing a
strong market for venture capital investments.4 Doing so could create
jobs, contribute to the real economy, provide increased access to credit for
many companies, improve access to talented employees, and serve as a
screening mechanism for quality companies.

4. As discussed in Private Equity in Brazil, private equity and venture capital are
sometimes treated as separate industries, as venture capitalists tend to invest in start-ups and
small businesses, whereas Private Equity firms tend to invest in larger, more established companies. However, venture capital may be considered a subset of the private equity industry
generally, and this is the approach taken in this paper. Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1
at 156 n 4. See also EUR. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. ASS’N., Guide on Private Equity
and Venture Capital for Entrepreneurs (2011), available at http://www.evca.eu/entrepreneur/
default.aspx?id=3540.
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1. A robust Brazilian private equity industry could increase job growth
and long-term job preservation and contribute to growth
in the real economy
Brazil should bolster its private equity industry, because doing so could
create jobs, preserve jobs in the long-term, and contribute to growth in the
real economy. The U.S. experience suggests that private equity backing
for companies creates jobs and increases revenue. A study by DRIWEFA, published by the National Venture Capital Association, found that
between 1970 and 2000, venture-capital-backed portfolio companies directly employed more than 12.5 million people in the U.S. and contributed
nearly $1.1 trillion to U.S. GDP in the year 2000.5 When companies that
provided supporting services, such as delivering goods and services, to the
portfolio companies were included, the figure rose to 27 million jobs.6 The
study found that, on average, every $36,000 in venture capital investments
created one new job.7
Job creation and revenue increases associated with a vibrant private
equity and venture capital industry could benefit small and mid-sized businesses in Brazil. Pagglia and Harjoto (2012) found that small and midsized businesses in the U.S. that received a private equity or venture capital investment created more jobs and raised more revenue in the five years
after the financing event than a control group.8 In a 1995 to 2009 study
analyzing 6,815 small and mid-sized businesses, firms that received private
equity investments experienced, on average, 129 percent more revenue
growth and 257 percent more employment growth than their non-VCbacked counterparts. At the end of five years, those companies that received private equity investments created an average of 36 more new jobs
than did control counterparts. Firms that received venture capital investments created, on average, 127 more new jobs compared to control counterparts.9
Firms that received venture capital investments had
approximately $24.7 million higher annual net sales per establishment five
years after the financing event, compared to the control group. For firms
with private equity financing, net sales were on average $6.9 million higher
per establishment five years after the financing event than for the control
group.10 The American experience suggests that developing a strong private equity and venture capital industry may help Brazilian companies create jobs and increase revenue.
5. Press Release, The Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, DRI-WEFA Study Identifies Venture Capital as Key Factor Powering U.S. Economic Growth (June 26, 2002), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dri-wefa-study-identifies-venture-capital-as-a-keyfactor-powering-us-economic-growth-77986182.html (citing DRI-WEFA, Measuring the Importance of Venture Capital and Its Benefits to the United States Economy, June 19, 2002).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Even if Brazil could not perfectly replicate the American experience,
having a vibrant private equity and venture capital industry would, at a
minimum, create jobs at least for those employed to manage the funds,
and also for the companies which receive investments. While it is true that
private equity firms often take over companies and lay off personnel in an
effort to cut costs, such measures could also lead to the ultimate preservation of the company and its return to profitability, thus saving jobs in the
long run which would have been eliminated if the company were left to
fail.11
Clearly, then, a strong private equity industry might help Brazilian
companies create jobs and increase revenue, for both large and small companies. Further, a robust private equity industry could help preserve jobs
already existing in Brazil, and contribute to the real economy in the long
run, by taking declining companies, which would otherwise have gone out
of business, and turning them into more profitable firms.
2. Private equity could increase access to credit for Brazilian companies
Brazil should encourage private equity activity to bridge financing gaps
for Brazilian companies which might not otherwise have access to credit.
Start-ups and small and medium enterprises frequently suffer from an inability to obtain credit through traditional modes of financing.12 A survey
conducted by the European Commission in collaboration with the European Central Bank found that, after finding customers, access to finance
was the second most pressing problem faced by European Union small
and medium enterprises.13 Similarly, surveys by the National Federation
of Independent Businesses (NFIB) between 2009 and 2011 found that,
among small businesses, the larger the small business, the more likely such
business had access to traditional lending through credit or business term
loans. However, during the recent financial crisis, the rates of this type of
financing declined across the board among small businesses.14 This trend
is to be expected, generally, small to medium enterprises suffer from less
access to credit because these businesses are seen as more risky and more
costly than larger firms, and have higher failure rates.15 Brazilian start-ups
and small businesses have an even more difficult time finding funding than
companies in more developed economies, because debt in Brazil tends to
11. See N. Robert Hammer, Private Equity Isn’t About Greed, It’s About Growth,
FORBES (Jan. 11, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/10/11/privateequity-isnt-about-greed-its-about-growth/.
12. SME’s Access to Finance: Survey 2011, Short Summary at 1, European Commission Enterprise and Industry, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/files/
2011_safe_summary_en.pdf.
13. Id.
14. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., NO. 0912, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT TO SMALL BUSINESSES 1 (2012), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/sbfreport2012.pdf.
15. Id. at 17.
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be more expensive.16 This lack of access to financing is a primary reason
that start-ups fail in Brazil.17 Private equity and venture capital funds can
solve this financing gap by providing companies with an infusion of capital
in exchange for a share of the upside and downside risks associated with
the investment.18
Private equity could also solve financing gaps in Brazil for large and
established companies that need an infusion of capital to continue growing.19 Sometimes, traditional lenders may be reluctant to lend at terms
agreeable to companies due to their aversion for risk.20 For example, in
Europe some firms have turned to private equity investments when banks
turned them down, or provided less favorable lending rates.21 When this
is the case, private equity can step in to fill the financing gap, charging
higher interest rates for loans that banks are unwilling to make.22
3. Private equity could help Brazilian companies increase business
know-how and attract talented managers
A robust private equity industry in Brazil could help Brazilian companies increase profitability by increasing business know-how at companies
that receive funding. Since private equity funds usually take an active role
in managing and overseeing their portfolio companies, they could provide
knowledge and expertise, monitoring and performance tools, consultation
regarding best-case-practices, opportunities for networking, mentoring
from other successful entrepreneurs, and introductions and appointments
for a companies’ board of advisers. These types of management benefits
could help Brazilian companies grow, increasing prosperity in the real
economy. By providing companies with expertise, private equity firms
could help companies pass the benefits of such better management on to
consumers in the form of better quality and lower cost products.
A private equity industry could also help Brazilian companies attract
talented managers. Brazilian companies have a hard time recruiting top
talent.23 A 2012 Survey by the ManpowerGroup found that Brazil had a
16. Tales Andreassi & Eduardo Madureira Rodrigues Siqueira, The Funding of New
Technology-based Firms in Brazil, 6 INT’L. J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION MGMT.
369, 370–373 (2006).
17. Id.
18. Dirk Engel, The Impact of Venture Capital on Firm Growth: An Empirical Investigation 1 (Centre for Eur. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 02-02, 2002), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319322.
19. See Anne-Sylvaine Chassany & Jesse Westbrook, Private Equity Enters Banks’
Turf in Europe, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201202-09/lending-void-draws-buyout-hedge-funds-to-banks-turf-in-europe.html.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. MANPOWERGROUP, 2012 TALENT SHORTAGE SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 4
(2012), available at http://www.manpowergroup.us/campaigns/talent-shortage-2012/pdf/2012_
Talent_Shortage_Survey_Results_US_FINALFINAL.pdf.
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harder time attracting talent than any other country in the Americas. Seventy-one percent of surveyed employers found it difficult to find employees that were qualified for their available jobs.24 Having a robust private
equity industry could help fill this management shortage by encouraging
talented foreign financial service managers to travel to Brazil to teach Brazilian managers better skill sets. The industry could also help provide
funds and advertising to attract domestic and foreign new hires to work
directly in management positions with Brazilian companies and invest in
on-the-job training in the form of seminars or career development
courses.25
4. Private equity may help screen good companies in Brazil
A strong private equity industry could help contribute to stability in
the Brazilian real economy by filtering out companies that are not poised
to succeed. Since private equity and venture capital investors are adept at
analyzing the value propositions of various companies, they ideally serve
as a “screen” for bad ideas or bad managers and aim to provide capital
only to those companies that are best-poised to succeed.26 Tavares conducted a statistical study of companies that conducted IPOs in Brazil between January 2004 and February 2007 and found that those companies
that received private equity funding were more likely to survive after one
year.27 Tavares concluded from these results that private equity investment acts as a “quality certification” for IPOs in Brazil and suggested that
private equity funds may have a value-creation role insofar as they prepare better portfolio companies for public market investment.28 In other
words, having a thriving private equity industry in Brazil not only benefits
private investors, but also benefits public investors, who enjoy long term
gains after buying stock in the company once it is turned over as a public
offering.
****
Because of the benefits that private equity can bring to the real economy, some scholars have concluded that every national administration
should strive to promote an efficient private equity and venture capital
industry.29 Finding that, on balance, a flourishing private equity industry
provides positive benefits for a country’s economic prosperity begs the
24. Id.
25. See Hammer, supra note 13 (describing the way that one private equity firm took
over a failing company and appointed a new CEO to turn it around).
26. Pedro Carvalho Araújo Tavares & Andrea Maria Accioly Fonseca Minardi, Does
Private Equity Investment Work as a Quality Certification for IPOs in Brazil? (June 14,
2010) (working paper series), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1624876.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Andreassi & Siqueria, supra note 16, at 374-77.
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question whether Brazil has encouraged the development of a strong and
stable private equity industry.
B. Has Brazil’s governmental regulation effectively encouraged the
private equity industry?
Brazil has effectively encouraged the growth of the private equity industry, by maintaining a regulatory environment that encourages both
supply and “demand” for private equity activity, but a further reduction in
interest rates would be beneficial for the continued growth of the industry.
As described by Gompers and Lerner in their research on the growth of
private equity industries worldwide, a private equity industry’s size depends on “supply” factors related to the number of investors willing to
commit money to private equity ventures, and “demand” factors related to
the number and quality of entrepreneurs and businesses seeking capital.30
Synthesizing findings from industry experts, Ribeiro et al. explain several
factors which increase “demand” in the private equity market, (i.e. the
number of entrepreneurs and businesses seeking more capital), and others
factors which increase “supply,” (i.e. the number of investors willing to
dedicate money to private equity funds).31 Here, I take the demand-side
and supply-side factors identified by Ribeiro et al. and assess whether Brazil’s government has sufficiently fostered an environment that allows the
private equity industry to grow, and whether tweaks to the regulatory environment are needed to promote industry growth. I conclude that overall, Brazil has done a commendable job of cultivating both supply and
demand for a flourishing private equity industry, but that further reductions in interest rates are advisable for the industry’s continued growth.
1. Demand-side factors leading to increased private equity activity
Factors identified by Ribeiro et al. that create “demand” for a private
equity industry are: (1) a reduction in capital gains taxes, (2) increases in
entrepreneurship activity, (3) increases in “innovative efforts,” and (4) reductions in interest rates. Brazil has successfully encouraged all four of
these demand-side factors, but a further reduction in interest rates would
be highly beneficial for the continued growth of the industry.
a. Reductions in capital gains taxes
Since private equity investments are taxed at capital gains rates, a reduction in the capital gains tax over time encourages investors to make
30. Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Fundraising?, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY (MICROECONOMICS ISSUE), 1998, at 150, available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1998%20micro/1998_bpeamicro_gompers.pdf.
31.

See LEONARDO DE LIMA RIBEIRO ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPIEMERGING ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL 2 (2006), available at http://
gvcepe.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/pevc_in_an_emerging_economy_evidence_from
_brazil.pdf.
TAL IN AN
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private equity investments.32 Brazil has progressively reduced its capital
gains tax rate for private equity investments by encouraging investment in
a special fund form, created specifically for private equity, called the
“FIP” (fundos de investimento em participações). The move towards increased investment in funds structured as FIPs as opposed to holding companies is discussed at length in Private Equity in Brazil.33 Two significant
differences between the holding company structure and the FIP structure
demonstrate why investors generally prefer to structure private equity investments as FIPs. First, profits under a holding company structure are
taxed at a much higher level than those that are generated under the FIP
form.34 While the FIP itself need never pay a capital gains tax, holding
companies must pay a 34 percent capital gains tax for the sale of equity
investments held by the holding company.35 While Brazilian FIP investors
pay, individually, a 15 percent capital gains tax when they redeem their
FIP quotas, Brazilian holding company investors pay a 20 percent capital
gains tax on any capital gains from their investments.36 International FIP
investors that hold less than 40 percent of a FIP’s quotas pay no capital
gains taxes whatsoever, and those who hold more than 40 percent pay a 15
percent capital gains tax. International investors that invest in holding
companies pay a 15 percent capital gains tax regardless of the size of their
investment in the fund.37 In addition to this unfavorable tax treatment,
while the FIP form allows write-offs in case of losses, only in limited circumstances may holding companies write off losses due to unsuccessful
investments.38 The result is that investors prefer using and increasingly
turn to the FIP as a vehicle for investment. Surely then, the creation of
the FIP investment vehicle for private equity funds, with its associated reduction in capital gains taxes, demonstrates that Brazil has created a vehicle that boosts the demand for a vibrant private equity industry. If Brazil
were to lower its capital gains treatment further, for both FIPs and holding
companies, it would likely stimulate demand for private equity investments even more, because investors respond quickly to tax incentives.

32.

See id.

33.

See Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 167-71.

34. See Antonio Gledson de Carvalho et al., Private Equity and Venture Capital in
Brazil: an Analysis of its Recent Evolution 7-8, (Getulio Vargas Foundation, Working Paper
No. G24, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996729.
35. GVCEPE ET AL., THE PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY: SECBRAZILIAN CENSUS 70 (1st ed., rev. Mar. 2012), http://gvcepe.com/site/wp-content/
uploads/2011/11/The-PEVC-Industry-Second-BR-Census-1ed-Revised-March-2012.pdf.
OND

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

De Carvalho et al., supra note 34, at 7.
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b. Increased entrepreneurship activity
Entrepreneurship activity is a second demand-side factor that generally
increases the number of start-ups seeking funding.39 Brazil has an extraordinary amount of entrepreneurship activity, but whether this is due to
the regulatory environment remains open to question. According to the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (“GEM”), the largest ongoing study of
entrepreneurial dynamics in the world, Brazil’s entrepreneurial activity is
remarkably high, and has increased in recent years.40 The GEM measures
“Total Entrepreneurship Activity” (or “TEA”), the proportion of a population between the ages of 18 and 64 years old that are involved in entrepreneurial activities or companies less than 42 months old. More
developed countries generally have lower levels of TEA as more people
take on service-oriented jobs.41 Among the 17 countries in the G-20 that
participated in the 2010 study, Brazil had the highest TEA, at 17.5 percent,
followed by China, with 14.4 percent.42 In absolute numbers, only China
possessed more entrepreneurs than Brazil.43
An analysis of whether Brazil’s high levels of entrepreneurship activity
is more the result of its regulatory regime, as opposed to culture or other
factors, is beyond the scope of this note. But, even without this analysis, it
is possible to conclude from the existence of high levels of entrepreneurship activity that the regulatory regime has not squelched such activity,
and has allowed it to grow. Thriving entrepreneurship activity contributes
to demand for private equity activity in Brazil, because investors, especially venture capitalists, are attracted to opportunities to invest in new
and profitable businesses and products.
c. Increased “innovative efforts”
“Innovative efforts” as measured by research and development expenditures and number of patent applications, is a third factor that increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs will seek funding.44 Innovative
efforts are a proxy for supply side growth because as entrepreneurs spend
money to research, develop and patent new ideas, they then seek funding
to build and market the product or idea they have developed, and capitalize on their innovation. Innovative efforts are distinguished from entrepreneurial activity, discussed above, because they focus on steps taken
to promote research and development and to protect technological advances. While there have been increases in this “demand-side” factor for
private equity in recent years, Brazil could do more to foster innovative
39.
40.
available
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, EMPREENDEDORISMO
at http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/download/451.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
RIBEIRO ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.

EN

BRASIL (2010),
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efforts by spending more on research and development and decreasing the
procedures and cost associated with filing a patent application.
Brazil has seen an increased demand for private equity by increasing
innovative efforts, as measured by research and development over time.45
Expenditures on research and development as a percentage of GDP has
been increasing according to World Bank Data, growing from 0.72 percent
of GDP spent on research and development in 1996 to 1.08 percent in
2008.46 However, Brazil lags behind other countries, including the U.S.
(2.79%), China (1.47%), and even small Slovenia (1.65%).47 To Brazil’s
credit, it spent more than Russia (1.04%) and other countries in Latin
America for which data was available.48 By spending more on research
and development, Brazil could contribute to the development of high-tech
industries, creating jobs for skilled laborers, and also cultivate more demand for private equity investments.
Brazil saw an increase in innovative efforts as measured by patent applications in the decade before the financial crisis, contributing to demand
for private equity. According to the World Bank Indicators for Technology, patent applications increased steadily in Brazil from 2000-2008, growing from 3080 applications in 2000 to 4084 in 2008.49 However, Brazilian
patent applications declined sharply after the crisis, dipping far below 2000
levels, to 2,705 in 2010.50 Further, Brazilian patent applications lagged far
behind some other countries in terms of absolute numbers and growth,
during the same period.51 The difference was most salient when comparing Brazil to China, where patent applications in 2000 were 25,346, and
grew to 293,066 by 2010, without a dip in patent applications after the
financial crisis.52
By reducing the red tape and cost associated with filing for patent applications, Brazil could encourage more individuals to patent their innovations, leading to increased innovative efforts, and more demand for private
equity. According to the U.S. State Department, it takes an astounding
eight years to obtain a patent in Brazil.53 Further, according to the World
Intellectual Property Organization, it costs more to obtain and maintain a
patent over time in Brazil than in the United States, China, Russia, Argen45. Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?page=3 (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
46.

Id. (referring to data available at the time of writing).

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49. Patent applications, residents, The WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.RESD/countries/BR-US-RU-IN-CN-AR-MX?display=default (last visited Mar.
3, 2013).
50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53. Bureau of Econ. and Bus. Affairs, 2012 Investment Climate Statement - Brazil, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (June 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191115.htm.
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tina, Mexico, and Italy, among others.54 Given these sobering statistics,
Brazil must reduce the time it takes to file a patent and decrease the cost
of doing so to increase innovative efforts, contributing to increased demand for private equity.
d. Reductions in interest rates
A final demand-side factor that encourages private equity investments
is a reduction in interest rates, which has a positive effect on demand for
capital.55 As discussed in Private Equity in Brazil, interest rates in Brazil
remain remarkably high as compared to other parts of the world, making
debt expensive.56 In 2011, the lending rate was 43.9 percent in Brazil,
compared to just 3.3 percent in the United States.57 In spite of Brazil’s
high interest rate, it should be noted that this rate is significantly lower
than it once was. In 1998, for example, Brazil’s lending rate was an astronomical 86.4 percent.58 By 2003, it had come down to 67.1 percent.59 This
data suggests that while Brazil’s interest rate could stand to improve even
more, the country has already started working toward improving each of
the four above factors that promote demand for private equity in Brazil.
On balance, Brazil has seen improvements in all of the demand-side
factors discussed by Ribeiro et al. that promote the growth of the country’s private equity industry. Notably, though, Brazil has room for improvement and could increase demand for private equity further by
lowering its crippling interest rates, spending more on research and development, and reducing the red tape associated with filing for patent
applications.
2. Supply-side factors leading to increased private equity activity
Like Brazil’s efforts to focus on demand-side factors that promote private equity in the country, Brazil has done well to improve supply-side
factors for the industry. The result has led to increased private equity activity. Three such improvements include allowing public pension funds to
invest in private equity vehicles, having a growing private pension fund
system, and requiring private equity firms to adopt high-quality accounting
standards.60
54. T. DAVID REED, WHERE IN THE WORLD SHOULD I FILE? (2004), available at http:/
/www.wipo.int/pct/en/pct_strategies/filing.pdf.
55.

See RIBEIRO

56.

Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 183.

ET AL.,

supra note 31, at 2

57. Lending Interest Rate, Data, THE World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
FR.INR.LEND (last visited March 20, 2013).
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

See RIBEIRO

ET AL.,

supra note 31, at 2.
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a. Allowing public pension funds to invest in private equity
Allowing public pension funds to invest in private equity vehicles is
one way to improve supply for private equity, because it increases the
amount of money private equity funds have available to invest.61 For example, after ERISA allowed U.S. pension funds to invest in private equity
funds, the supply of funds for private equity greatly expanded, providing a
boost for the industry.62 As discussed Private Equity in Brazil, Brazil
raised the cap on the percentage of money that Brazilian pension funds
are allowed to allocate to alternative investments from two percent to 20
percent in 2009, liberating a massive amount of funds available for private
equity investment.63 In this way, Brazil stimulated supply for private equity in the country.
However, Brazil might be able to enact a few more reforms to increase
the benefits associated with having this class of institutional investors.
Brazilian pension funds can be involved in guiding the nature of the private equity investment, which may discourage experienced private equity
investors who do not want to deal with having “too many cooks in the
kitchen.” Since American investors will likely be reluctant to deal with
extremely active pension funds, a serious policy question arises about
whether or not the active management of the pension funds is, on balance,
a good thing for the Brazilian private equity industry. If it is found that
pension funds are not the best managers of private equity funds and also
discourage investment in Brazil, it might make sense to revise legislation
which gives certain large investors (invariably pension funds) a seat on the
board of FIPs. Alternatively, if it is found that the presence of pension
funds presents a net benefit effect for the solidity of the private equity
industry this legislation should be left standing.
b. Increasing the size of the private pension fund market
Another way to increase private equity in Brazil is to increase the size
of the private pension fund market. When the private pension market
grows, the supply of funds available to invest in private equity will also
grow, especially now that Brazil has raised the cap on the percentage of
money that Brazilian pension funds are allowed to allocate to alternative
investments.64 Brazil’s private pension fund market is the oldest in Latin
America, and is experiencing a period of rapid growth.65 According to a
2011 Global Pension Asset Study, covering the world 13 largest pension
markets, Brazil had the fastest growing private pension market between
61.

See id.

62.

Id.

63.

Private Equity in Brazil supra note 1, at 160.

64.

Id. at 170-71.

65. ADACIR REIS & LEONARDO ANDRÉ PAIXÃO, PRIVATE PENSIONS
(2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/40/42601981.pdf.

IN

BRAZIL
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2000 and 2010.66 Data from the National Federation of Private Pension
and Life shows that accumulated reserves in benefit plans grew from $16
billion in 2001 to $270 billion in 2011.67 An aging population and economy transitioning from a consumer society to a savings society, along with
regulatory reforms put in place by the Plano Real, discussed in Private
Equity in Brazil, paved the way for the growth of private pension funds.68
The increase in availability of private pension funds has clearly contributed to Brazil’s supply of private equity investment.
c. Adopting high quality accounting standards
The adoption of high-quality accounting standards is a third factor
which contributes to the supply of private equity investments. When
countries insist that private equity funds adopt high-quality accounting
standards, investor confidence is boosted, they are more willing to make
investments, and the supply of funds increases.69 Brazil has done well to
adopt high quality accounting standards. Brazil’s Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (“CVM”), requires private equity funds to use independent auditors registered with the CVM to
audit yearly financial statements and disclose information related to their
financial position in accordance with international accounting standards.70
These measures, in turn, work to improve investor confidence in the
industry.
****
In sum, by allowing pension funds to invest in private equity, by encouraging a larger private pension fund market, and by requiring private
equity funds to maintain strong accounting standards, Brazil has successfully encouraged the supply of private equity funds.71
C. Should the Brazilian government take an active stance regulating the
private equity industry and reforming the judiciary?
A third regulatory policy question, related to whether Brazil should
actively foster the private equity industry is to what extent should the Brazilian government actively regulate the industry, and take steps to ensure
that regulations are enforced fairly and expediently through the judiciary.
66. TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSET STUDY 2011, at 13 (2011), available at
http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3761/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2011.pdf.
67. Ivy Cassa, Brazil, the Population Aging and the Market of Insurance and Private
Pension, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL (June 21, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/insurance-law/
article_KLA-Koury-Lopes-Advogados_1536442.htm.
68. Id. See Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 157.
69. See RIBEIRO ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.
70. CVM Instruction No. 391 (2003), available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/cvm
_391.ASP.
71. See RIBEIRO ET AL., supra note 31, at 9.
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Brazil should take an active stance regulating the private equity industry
and take steps to improve its judiciary. Strong regulations and an efficient
judiciary encourage private equity investment, whereas poor regulations
and unpredictable legal structures hinder investment.72
Institutional factors, such as a country’s quality of regulation and legal
system, shape the design of the private equity industry by influencing the
way investors choose to structure their private equity vehicles, and shape
the extent of industry growth by influencing the amount of capital investors are willing to commit.73 Brazil could improve its regulatory environment by (1) reforming its legal system, and (2) improving the quality of
regulations.
1. Brazil should improve its legal system to encourage
private equity development
A country’s legal system is the paramount institutional factor influencing the design and development of private equity industries worldwide.74
Common law countries are better poised to develop vibrant venture capital markets than civil law countries because they traditionally offer more
investor protection than civil law countries.75 Better legal systems allow
for significant improvements in corporate governance among private equity and venture capital firms.76 Specifically, systems with stronger legal
protections lead to faster screening and origination of deals, a greater
probability that deals will lead to syndication, better representation of investors at the board-level, lower need for capital calls prior to exit, and
more investment in high-tech companies.77 Further, valuations of companies are positively correlated with quality investor protection in a country’s

72. See generally, id. at 2 (citing William L. Megginson, Towards a Global Model of
Venture Capital?, 16 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89, 95 (2004)), Douglas Cumming & Grant
Fleming, A Law and Finance Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Emerging Markets (Sept.
2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Austl. Nat’l Univ.), available at http://
cbe.anu.edu.au/media/1436976/finm0028wp.pdf; Douglas Cumming et al., Legality and Venture Governance Around the World, 25 J. BUS. VENTURING 54 (2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1611366; Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 120 Q. J. ECON. 1
(2005).
73. See William L. Megginson, Towards a Global Model of Venture Capital?. 16 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89, 95 (2004).

OF

74. RIBEIRO ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (citing William L. Megginson, Toward a Global
Model of Venture Capital?, 16.1 J APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89, 106 (2004)).
75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.
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legal system.78 Conversely, in countries with poor legal systems, investors
discount the prices of firms to offset the risk of expropriation.79
Brazil ranks 82nd worldwide for investor protection, according to the
International Finance Corporation and World Bank’s Doing Business Project, which measures protection of investors by looking at extent of disclosure, director liability, and ease of shareholder suits.80 Of the BRIC
countries, Brazil came in second for shareholder protection, lagging considerably behind India (49th) but offering more protection than both
China (100th) and the Russian Federation (117th).81 Regionally, Brazil
had more protections than some Latin American countries including, Venezuela (181st), and Argentina (117th); but much less than others, including
Mexico (49th), Peru (13th), and Colombia (6th).82 Colombia, the regional
winner for investor protection, is tied with the United States.83
Brazil should do more to encourage investor protection in order to encourage the development of a vibrant private equity industry, and should
strive to be a leader in Latin America, like Colombia and Peru. A comprehensive discussion about ways to improve investor protection in Brazil
is beyond the scope of this note, but Brazil could consider increasing disclosure requirements, imposing more director liability for key transactions,
and making it easier for shareholders to bring suits against public
companies.
With increasing investor protection, Brazil must improve its legal system by increasing the predictability and efficiency of its judiciary. In 2004,
the Economist complained that “Brazil’s judiciary is dysfunctional: agonisingly slow, beset with frivolous cases designed to evade justice and enmeshed in useless procedure.”84 That year, Brazilian president Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva passed legislation to reform the judiciary called the
First Republican Pact (“First Pact”).85 Through the First Pact, Brazil attempted to streamline the procedures for working issues through the judiciary, and Constitutional Amendment 45, created the National Council of
78. RIBEIRO ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (citing Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does
Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity,
120(1) Q. J. ECON. 223, 240 (2005)).
79. Ricardo P.C. Leal & André L. Carvalhal-da-Silva, Corporate Governance and
Value in Brazil (and in Chile), in INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
FIRM LEVEL EVIDENCE ACROSS LATIN AMERICA 213, 276 (Alberto Chong & Florencio de
Silanes eds., 2007).
80. Protecting Investors, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/explore
topics/protecting-investors (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84. Brazil’s Judiciary: Not-So-Swift Justice, THE ECON. (March 27, 2004), http://www.
economist.com/node/2542089.
85. Eduardo Soares, Brazil: Reform of the Judiciary, LIBRARY OF CONG. (April 24,
2009), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401233_text.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE205.txt

Spring 2013]

unknown

Seq: 17

Regulation of Private Equity in Brazil

10-JUN-13

12:58

325

Justice and the position of Secretary of Judicial Reform.86 The First Pact
also gave the agency power to design and implement reforms.87 In 2009,
the Second Republican Pact introduced additional measures aimed at judicial reform, including changes to the process for interlocutory appeals,
aimed at speeding up the long process of reaching a final decision in Brazil, and improving uniformity in judgment and sentencing procedures
throughout the country to reduce the uncertainty associated with going to
court.88 In 2011, a Third Republican Pact (“Third Pact”) was proposed
and scheduled to be signed by the end of May 2011.89 Signing was pushed
off until August 2011, when talks stalled.90 Soon after, all negotiations
came to a halt. Then, on January 8, 2013, the Minister of Justice met with
the President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal to discuss an effort to restore negotiations for the Third Pact in hopes of passing it in 2013.91 The
Third Pact aims to combat problems related to Brazil’s prison system and
security.92 In tandem with these reforms, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
created specialized business courts. However, the São Paulo court is limited to bankruptcy and financial restructuring, and critics claim that the
judicial process remains slow, and that judges suffer from a lack of expertise related to corporate issues.93
While these reforms are a step in the right direction, more needs to be
done. Brazil’s legal system is still described as “among the world’s most
convoluted,” and critics point out that the “administration of justice is
slow and cumbersome.”94 While a comprehensive discussion on judicial
reform is beyond the scope of this note, Brazil should work to improve the
certainty and expediency of its judiciary as it relates to investor claims.

86. Republican Pact: Partnership Among the Three Branches of the State at the Service
of Democracy, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/
cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfDestaque_en_us&idConteudo=174050.
87.

Id.

88. Id. See also Débora Zampier, Terceiro Pacto Republicano Será Assinado em
Agosto, AGENCIA BRASIL (July 9, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/
2011-07-09/terceiro-pacto-republicano-sera-assinado-em-agosto.
89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91. Wanessa Rodrigues, Ministro da Justiça Discute III Pacto Republicano com Presidente do STF, ROTA JURÍDICA (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.rotajuridica.com.br/index.php/stf/
item/1671-ministro-da-justi%C3%A7a-discute-iii-pacto-republicano-com-presidente-do-stf
92.

Id.

93. Black et al, The Corporate Governance of Privately Controlled Brazilian Firms
(Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1003059.
94. Kate O’Sullivan, Brazil is Booming (and Maddening), CFO MAGAZINE (July 15,
2010), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14508833; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DOING BUSINESS AND INVESTING IN BRAZIL at 19 (2005), http://www.pwc.com.br/pt/publicacoes/assets/
doing-business-brazil05.pdf.
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2. Brazil should increase enforcement actions to improve
the regulatory environment
Instituting quality regulatory systems that impose not only regulations
but also consequences for rule-breakers encourages private equity activity
by giving investors confidence that the rules of the game are certain.95 In
countries that bring more enforcement actions against private equity and
venture capital funds, investors put more money in high-tech small and
medium enterprises, exit more often through IPOs over buybacks, and
generally achieve higher rates of returns.96 Conversely, poor regulatory
environments negatively affect private equity investment.97 In countries
with weak regulatory enforcement systems managers are more likely to
buy controlling stakes in the company (so as to maximize their own control and oversight), creating possible conflicts of interest for minority
shareholders.98
For these reasons, Brazil should take an active regulatory approach
that encourages enforcement actions against rule-breakers. Before addressing which regulatory issues Brazil should tackle, however, it is important to discuss the regulatory entities that Brazil should rely on to set and
enforce regulations.
D. Which actors are best suited to set and enforce policies related to
private equity: government agencies
or self-regulating associations?
Implicit in any discussion of regulatory choice is the question of which
entities are best suited to make and enforce regulatory policy. As discussed in Private Equity in Brazil, both the Brazilian government and selfregulatory agencies currently set regulations for private equity players in
Brazil.99 In this section, I argue that neither the Brazilian government, via
the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (“CVM”), nor the selfregulatory agencies that purport to impose rules on private equity players
do a sufficient job of setting and enforcing regulations.
1. The Brazilian government, through the CVM, does not adequately
set and enforce regulations
The Brazilian Government relies on the CVM to oversee a private equity fund’s basic registration and to review any warranties it plans to make
to investors.100 In this way, the CVM essentially stands as a gate-keeper
95. RIBEIRO ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (citing Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, A Law and Finance Analysis of Venture Capital in Emerging Markets (2002) (unpublished working paper, on file with University of Alberta).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 160.
100. Id.
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for entrance into the private equity market.101 However, entrance is easy
and registration is granted automatically provided certain criteria are
met.102 In reality, the CVM does not begin to pay close attention to private equity activities until the funds purchase shares on the Brazilian stock
markets, or take their portfolio companies public through an IPO.103 The
general justification for this policy is that these markets pose much greater
risks to the well-being of the financial system as a whole than do the activities of sophisticated investors working with privately-held companies.104
Although the CVM works to maintain two explicit goals for protecting
investors and financial information access. The CVM articulates these
goals as (1) seeking to “monitor the information divulged about investment funds in order to foment an environment of trust among investors in
the market stemming from the availability of appropriate information,
which enables investors to make conscious and informed decisions;”105
and (2) seeking to monitor “the administration and management of investment funds, so as to promote the development of an environment of credibility in the market through management that emphasizes technical skills,
poise, diligence, transparency, and independence of professionals.”106
While these goals are laudable, the two objectives go only so far as to
make the market appear credible as opposed to striving for actual credibility. Understandably, the CVM’s focused on investor confidence must not
be trivialized. The importance of investor confidence is crucial to the
functioning of a capital market that relies on investors’ confidence. However, the CVM should not tailor its supervision policies only to the specific
goal of improving the market to cater to the confidence of investors. The
CVM should direct its activities to improving the long-run accountability
of the actual institutions and markets themselves. Doing so will ensure the
health and sustainability of the market and will naturally improve investor
confidence and perpetuate investment and activity in the market.
Given CVM’s narrow policy goals, the agency itself is not poised to
take an active enough regulatory role to ensure high quality levels of private equity activity in Brazil. The following discusses some other regulatory organizations that may help improve quality control in the country’s
private equity market.

101.

Id.

102.

Id.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105. COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS [CVM], SUPERVISÃO BASEADA EM RISCO
(SBR), PLANO BIENAL 2011-2012 [RISK BASED SUPERVISION, BIENNIAL PLAN 2011-2012], 34
(2011), http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/public/publ/revista/Plano%20Bienal%20CVM%2020112012.pdf [hereinafter CVM BIENNIAL REPORT].
106.

Id.
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2. Self-regulatory agencies that purport to set and enforce regulations
do so ineffectively and suffer from conflicts of interest
Three non-government self-regulatory associations provide what purports to be additional oversight and protection for Brazilian investors: (1)
The Brazilian Association of Entities in the Financial and Capital Markets
(Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de
Capitais, or “ANBIMA”); (2) The Brazilian Association of Private Equity
and Venture Capital (Associação Brasileira de Private Equity e Venture
Capital or “ABVCAP”); and (3) BM&FBOVESPA, the São Paulo Stock
Exchange. As discussed in Private Equity in Brazil, each of these organizations is independent of the Brazilian government, privately run, and purports to set and enforce regulations on those who participate in them.107
In this section, I argue that these agencies have too many conflicts of interest and are not independent enough to succeed at setting and enforcing
private equity regulations in Brazil.
a. ANBIMA and ABVCAP’s Code of Regulations for
private equity is insufficient
ANBIMA is an association comprised of market participants that aims
to promote members’ interests and brands in addition to providing internal self-regulation among members.108 Similarly, ABVCAP is a nonprofit organization that strives to promote the growth of private equity
and venture capital in Brazil. Together, these two self-regulators recently
released a code that provides best-case practices and enforcement mechanisms for all those who choose to adhere to its rules.
Since the ANBIMA and ABVCAP code is less than a few years old, it
is impossible to determine the exact affect the regulations will have on
encouraging quality private equity activity in Brazil. However, it is useful
to evaluate the stated goals of the code in order to evaluate its potential
for improving the private equity environment in Brazil. Article 1 of
ANBIMA and ABVCAP’s Code for the Regulation and Best Practices
[sic] of Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds, establishes that the
Code’s purpose is to:
Establish the parameters that should serve to guide the activities of the Participating Institutions. . .as regards the creation and modus operandi of Private
Equity Funds . . .for the purpose, principally of: I. ensuring transparency in the
execution of their activities, making it easier to quantify and monitor the development of the sector; II. enabling the standardization of their practices and
processes; III. contributing towards their credibility and proper functioning;
IV. maintaining the highest possible ethical standards and institutionalizing
the concept of fair practices; V. raising fiduciary standards and furthering best
market practices; and VI. promoting, to the extent possible, the harmoniza107.
108.

Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 160-62.
Id. at 161-62.
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tion and gradual integration between the Brazilian market for FIPs/FIEEs
and the international private equity and venture capital markets.109

The code contains extensive rules and best-case practices, which are
binding on members affiliated with either ABVCAP or ANBIMA, and
members who agree to abide by its terms. In exchange for following the
rules of ANBIMA’s code, private equity funds can place on their documents a seal indicating that they adhere to the Code. Notably, Chapter
XX titled, “Procedures for Investigating Irregularities,” states that the
Technical Department, a department created within the two organizations
“shall investigate any cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this
Code upon its own initiative or upon receipt of a complaint.”110 However,
“only complaints presented by Participating Institutions shall be accepted.”111 In other words, individuals may not bring a complaint for investigation before the Technical Department - only participating
institutions may do so. Once the Technical Department investigates a
complaint and finds a code violation, the Department is not required to
take particularly harsh enforcement actions against the party for violating
the code. Article 60 of the Code makes clear that “[w]here the infraction
is found to offer little potential damage and [can be] easily remedied,” the
Technical Department may simply issue a recommendation, upon concurrence from the Chairman of the Regulation and Best Practices Board, that
outlines how the entity can come back into compliance with the code.112
Such “enforcement action” is nothing more than a slap on the wrist and
does nothing to remedy the loss suffered by harmed parties. The following
paragraph in Article 60 states that the Regulation and Best Practices
Board may relax this standard even further by promulgating a regulation
that allows the Technical Department to issue such a recommendation
without even the concurrence of the Chairman, effectively eliminating the
Technical Committee’s second layer of review.113
These relaxed enforcement provisions are justified on the grounds that,
by their terms, they apply only to de minimis infractions, or infractions
“found to offer little potential damage and [are] easily remedied.”114
However, the code offers no discernible standard for determining when an
infraction is de minimis, nor does it identify the department responsible
for making such determinations. Accordingly, these provisions offer wide
latitude for abuse within what is merely a voluntary regulatory regime, and
109. ABVCAP-ANBIMA, REGULATION BEST PRACTIVES CODE PRIVATE EQUITY
AND VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS art. 1, at 3, available at http://portal.anbima.com.br/fundosde-investimento/regulacao/codigo-fip-fiee/Documents/Code%20-%20ANBIMA%20ABV
CAP.pdf.
110.

Id. art. 56, at 25.

111.

Id.

112.

Id. art. 60, at 26.

113.

Id. at 27.

114.

Id. at 26.
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present a clear opportunity for regulatory arbitrage by the joining
members.
On the other hand, there may be several positive benefits associated
with the Code. First, allowing Private Equity funds to choose whether to
participate in the Code can present a more efficient way of promoting participation than attempting to force change through a cumbersome process
of government regulatory reform.115 It may also be cheaper for the Brazilian taxpayer, since ANBIMA and ABVCAP are privately funded. Further, a large portion of private equity and venture capital firms are already
subject to the code, since many had joined ANBIMA and ABVAP already. Private equity funds that subject themselves to stricter rules signal
to national and international investors that the institutions are committed
to acting with integrity.
Additionally, since instances of noncompliance are publicized, and
since non-complying entities must remove the ANBIMA-ABVAP seal
from their investor documents, which could trigger investor flight, competing funds have an incentive to raise noncompliance complaints against a
non-compliant peer. In other words, subscribing funds may have an incentive to police each other and an incentive to regulate their own internal
operations in order to comply with the code and preserve their reputation.
The ABVCAP code is probably a step forward to achieving improvements in its stated goals, including helping to promote transparency,
preventing conflicts of interest, protecting investors, and helping improve
data collection related to the industry. The code’s mere existence and the
associational nature may encourage compliance in ways that are hard to
quantify. However, on balance, the self-regulatory nature of the code
raises several red flags for those who believe that maintaining a high quality of regulation is imperative to ensuring the integrity of the equity markets and the private equity industry generally. The SEC has described
some of the many problems inherent with self-regulatory organizations as
follows:
Pressures that inhibit effective regulation and discourage vigorous enforcement against members can arise for a variety of reasons, including member
domination of SRO funding, member control of SRO governance, and member influence over regulatory and enforcement staff. In addition, the economic importance of certain SRO members may create particularly acute
conflicts.116
115. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S., and the EU (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Series, Working
Paper No. 390; Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 368; Yale Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 399; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 149/2010; Rock Center for Corp.
Governance at Stanford U. Working Paper No. 80, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1541226.
116. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71256 (proposed Dec.
8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/3450700.pdf.
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The nature of enforcement under the code seems to suffer from some
of these flaws. The code resembles little more than a “window dressing”
that does not provide any actual regulatory substance. The code is advanced by an institution that styles itself as a representative of the institutions it purports to police. This signals important agency and conflicts of
interest issues: how can ANBIMA be both a representative of, for example, private equity firms and also attempt to be an impartial promoter of
best practices? The nature of the code’s development, in which regulated
entities contribute to the code’s rules, also raises questions about the impartiality of the rules themselves. While it may be good to obtain input
from the regulated entities, these same entities likely have incentives to
push for rules that make them look good in the eyes of international investors, but which impose minimal burdens on the entities themselves, even if
more burdens would be better for “the system.” Further, without an impartial regulator, the only interests represented at the negotiating table are
those of the regulated entities themselves, not consumers, investors, taxpayers generally, or even the Brazilian government. Such unilateral rulemaking invariably raises questions about who the real winners are in this
scheme.
Since the ANBIMA-ABVCAP code is still young, only time will tell
whether it turns out to be an effective regulatory mechanism. If the selfregulatory agencies ANBIMA and ABVCAP actually insist on enforcing
violations related to the code and make such enforcement mechanisms
known, as opposed to just serving as a nominal regulator for the benefit of
the funds’ illusory credibility, it will send very positive messages to the
international investment communities that Brazil has struck a responsible
balance between self-regulation and governmental oversight. In many
ways, if ANBIMA and ABVCAP were to make an early example out of
some fund that violates the code, it would add legitimacy to the regulatory
nature of the organization. Until this happens, and happens with some
consistency, the balance of self-regulatory mechanisms and governmental
regulation appears tipped too far in the realm of subjective self-regulation
as opposed to credible and objective government enforcement. In order
to ensure that the Brazilian private equity industry remain reputable, additional government oversight of the industry, beyond ANBIMA and ABVCAP is advised.
b. BM&FBOVESPA’s self-regulatory regime is insufficient
As discussed in Private Equity in Brazil, BM&FBOVESPA, the São
Paulo Stock Exchange, attempts to impose some regulations on private
equity investments when these exit through an initial public offering, listed
on the exchange.117 Gilson has argued that the stock exchange, by giving
listing companies the option of voluntarily listing on the Novo Mercado
segment, which imposes higher corporate governance standards, has pro117.

Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 160.
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vided positive benefits to the integrity of the Brazilian capital markets.118
For Gilson, the problems with enacting extensive reforms in countries, like
Brazil, which are controlled by an entrenched elite, is that the individuals
in control have very little incentive to reform existing regulations, because
they ostensibly benefit from the current regime.119 By giving companies
the option, but not obligation, to voluntarily submit to higher corporate
governance standards, BM&FBOVESPA uses the technique of regulatory
dualism (two choices of regulations), and overcomes some of the political
problems associated with comprehensive reform.120
While BM&FBOVESPA claims to impose higher standards of corporate governance for companies that list on its exchanges, some data suggests that corporate governance standards, even among companies that list
on the Novo Mercado segments, remains relatively weak.121 In a study of
88 Brazilian private firms listed on the stock exchange, Black, Carvalho,
and Gorga found that one area of regulatory weakness is the lack of enforcement to ensure the independence of a funds’ board compositions.122
The study found that most boards are run by insiders or representatives of
the controlling family or group who owns the fund.123 It is common for
boards not to have any independent directors.124 Additionally,
BM&FBOVESPA’s enforcement of its financial disclosure standards are
relatively weak compared to international enforcement over financial
standards.125 According to the 2005 data, firms listed at higher segments
of the BM&FBOVESPA stock exchange were required to disclose additional financial statements, such as cash flow statements, IFRS or GAAP
financials.126 English disclosures, and consolidated quarterly financial
118. See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S., and the EU (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Series,
Working Paper No. 390; Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 368; Yale Law and
Econ. Research Paper No. 399; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 149/2010; Rock Center for
Corp. Governance at Stanford U. Working Paper No. 80, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1541226.
119.

Id. at 6.

120.

Id.

121. See generally Bernard S. Black et al., The Corporate Governance of Privately Controlled Brazilian Firms (U. of Texas Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 109; Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-014; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 206/2008,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003059.
122.

Id.

123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125.

Id.

126. Brazil began requiring the use of International Financial Reporting Standards for
all listed companies and large financial institutions in 2010. See Ernst & Young, IFRS in
Brazil – Spotlight on Brazil’s IFRS Adoption, IFRS OUTLOOK, March 2012, at 6, http://www.
ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/IFRS_Outlook_-_March_2012/$FILE/IFRS%20Outlook%
20March%202012.pdf.
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statements, depending on the level of listing.127 However, not all companies complied with these standards, and no action was taken to enforce
disclosures.128
Donegá points to a number of issues that undermine the credibility of
BM&FBOVESPA as an effective self-regulatory organization.
BM&FBOVESPA’s Market Surveillance organization (BM&FBOVESPA
Supervisão de Mercados, or “BSM”) is an independent body from the
stock exchange. However, Donegá argues that it is only relatively independent and therefore not completely free from agency capture.129 First,
he notes that the BSM is subjected to the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“CVM’s”) supervision; and though it has its own
budget, staff, expertise, and resources, there is no mention of its structural
independence from CVM.130 Further, BSM is not administratively independent, because BM&FBOVESPA holds 99 percent of BSM shares, and
the Bank of BM&F Settlement and Custody Services, S.A., holds 1 percent.131 Finally, approximately one third of BM&FBOVESPA’s capitalization comes from foreign investors, who may not have the proper
incentives to increase regulation.132 These issues raise serious questions
about the ability of the Stock Exchange to be an impartial regulator.
More recent data related to BM&FBOVESPA’s efficacy as a self-regulatory organization is lacking, but the data that is available suggests that the
exchange, acting alone, does not do a sufficient job setting and enforcing
regulations.
****
The apparent inefficiency of the CVM and self-regulatory organizations means that Brazil needs to consider either increasing enforcement at
the CVM or realigning the incentives of the self-regulatory organizations
to ensure better enforcement. While this paper points to the issues inherent in the Brazilian private equity market’s current self-regulatory regime,
a comprehensive solution to its weaknesses is beyond the scope of discussion here. In the next section, I turn from examining the market’s private
self-regulatory regimes and look at Brazil’s government regulations. I ask
what sorts of risks Brazilian regulators should focus on, and attempt to
analyze the efficacy of current regulation.
127. Raul Pinheiro Donegá, Analyzing Cross Border Investment Opportunities and
Mechanisms of Investor Protection: A Case Study of BM&F BOVESPA 14-5 (Univ. of B.C.,
Working Paper No. K22, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595887.
128.

Id. at 15.

129.

Id. at 17.

130.

Id.

131.

Id. at 18-19.

132.

Id. at 5.
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III. CRITIQUE: WHAT SORTS OF RISKS SHOULD BRAZILIAN
REGULATORS WORRY ABOUT AND HOW EFFECTIVELY DO THEY
APPEAR TO BE ADDRESSING EACH RISK
In this section, I identify major risks that have been linked to private
equity transactions and I assess whether Brazil is effectively guarding
against each risk. To define risks posed by private equity, I rely on two
key reports: the International Organization of Securities Commissions’
(“IOSCO”) Final Report on Private Equity, and the CVM’s Biennial Supervision Plan. First, IOSCO’s Final Report on Private Equity lays out
general risks posed by private equity markets throughout the world, evaluates whether or not each risk relates to IOSCO’s three objectives of securities regulation and recommends additional studies related to specific risks
be undertaken, as needed.133 Second, the CVM’s 2011-2012 Biennial Supervision Plan is mandated by CVM Deliberation No. 521/07, which requires the CVM to release a report every two years that reviews its work
in regulating the Brazilian private equity market.134 The report reviews
four regulatory indicators specifically: (1) the “general actions” that the
CVM must take to ensure it complies with its legal mandate and enumerated goals; (2) the “risk events” that the CVM believes threaten its goals,
classified in terms of probability of occurrence and the potential for harm
should they occur; (3) the priority actions for regulation and supervision to
adopt in the coming two years in order to mitigate the identified risks,
including detailed and specific actions to be taken; (4) the discretionary
activities, or measures that the CVM might adopt if there are compelling
reasons.135 After classifying risks by probability of occurrence and potential harm, the CVM allocates most of its resources to combating higher
risk activities.136 By scrutinizing the CVM’s latest report, which appears
to be the most topical evaluation from the Brazilian Government of its
own view of private equity risks, I assess the progress of Brazil’s regulators
at combating areas of known risk.
In this section, I compare Brazil’s assessment of risks against those
risks identified by IOSCO in order to determine whether the international
and national regulator’s share similar regulatory objectives. While the
question of whether Brazil’s regulators are actually working to minimize
risks and meet their objectives is beyond the scope of this note, this section
analyzes whether Brazil is on the right track to managing risks within its
private equity industry, or if other risks, common to private equity markets, are issues which Brazil should address. Careful management of these
risks will improve the strength and reputation of Brazil’s private equity
industry. .
133. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, PRIVATE EQUITY FINAL REPORT 36 (2008), http://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD274.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO].
134.

CVM BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 105.

135.

Id.

136.

Id.
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A. Private equity generally generates risks related to increased leverage in
capital markets, but this is not a risk that Brazil needs to
worry about at present
A private equity market can significantly increase leverage in capital
markets where leveraged buyouts are common, but this places significant
pressure on companies to service their debts and would most likely cause
harm to both public and private markets if very large firms defaulted.137
When an institution is highly leveraged, pro-cyclicality can be amplified.138
This means that if investor confidence dissipates and the value of collateral
securities falls, highly-leveraged institutions may experience abrupt deleveraging and may need to conduct a fire sale, resulting in massive losses
to investments.139 IOSCO found that issues related to increasing leverage
were relevant to the IOSCO objectives of increasing investor protection
and decreasing systemic risk.140 The Technical Committee recommended
that IOSCO’s Joint Forum, a subcommittee, conduct a large-scale survey
to measure leveraged buyout activity across member jurisdictions.
As mentioned in Private Equity in Brazil, LBO-like acquisitions are
virtually non-existent in Brazil, due to the high cost of debt, which largely
eliminates the traditional concern about systemic risk related to leverage.141 Not surprisingly, then, Brazil’s regulators have not voiced any concerns about the risk of high leverage in their private equity regime.
Given the near-complete lack of leverage in the Brazilian private equity markets, this major risk posed by private equity in other parts of the
world need not be addressed by Brazilian regulators at present. Still,
should LBOs become more common in Brazil’s future, Brazilian regulators should pay close attention to the potential for systemic risk caused by
large amounts of leverage.

137.

Id. at 10.

138. See Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and its Regulation in Europe, 14 (Univ. of Oxford, Paper No. 40/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1886186.
139.

Id.

140.

IOSCO, supra note 133, at 14.

141. Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 183. By contrast, these transactions
should be of large concern to American and European private equity regulators, because of
the large number of LBOs conducted in those markets. Still, some commentators suggest
that because portfolio-companies are generally not cross-collateralized in leveraged buyout
transactions, even if one company fails the threat of knock-on effects for other funds and
portfolio companies within the same fund is minimal. Payne, supra note 138, at 15. Further,
it’s possible that no negative externalities would result even if a private equity fund did need
to perform a fire sale, because its assets are largely heterogeneous, and exposure to particular
risks is minimized because private equity funds diversify their portfolios by investing in many
industries. Id.
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B. Private equity transactions present the potential for market abuse
problems and Brazil should pay particular attention to this
risk due to high levels of corruption
Private equity creates potential market abuse problems in capital markets because sensitive price information flows constantly between parties
and generally increases with the complexity of the transaction. Jurisdictions that do not have market abuse oversight mechanisms may face investor confidence issues, which leads to less capital in the system.142 IOSCO
found that market abuse risks were relevant for the IOSCO objectives of
increasing investor protection and promoting fair and efficient markets.143
The Technical Committee emphasized that market abuse and fraud prevention measures remained key priorities for IOSCO’s work, but did not
mandate any additional IOSCO work to be done towards combating these
threats.
Brazil’s CVM identified some risks related to market abuse problems
in its Biennial Report. One of the CVM’s goals is to “monitor[ ] the administration and management of investment funds, so as to promote the
development of an environment of credibility in the market through management that emphasizes technical skills, poise, diligence, transparency,
and independence of professionals.”144 In keeping with this goal, the
CVM noted that the presence of untrained Brazilian “managers and directors that lack the appropriate policies regarding internal controls, compliance with regulation, routine risk management, and prevention of money
laundering,” was one risk threatening Brazil’s private equity market.145
The CVM also monitors “the information divulged about investment
funds in order to foment an environment of trust among investors in the
market stemming from the availability of appropriate information, which
enables investors to make conscious and informed decisions.”146 Pursuant
to this goal, however, the CVM found that “the existence of funds whose
activity and regulations do not fully adhere to current legislation,” was
another identifiable risk that could undermine Brazil’s private equity
market.147
Notably, the CVM, in keeping with its goals, successfully identified the
potential for market abuse and made sure that prevention of market abuse
is a stated regulatory goal. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the actual
efficacy with which the CVM has pursued its goal and the actual level of
threat posed by private equity in this area, because the CVM does not
make these enforcement decisions public. The downside of making information related to market abuse public is that it would undermine confi142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

IOSCO, supra note 133, at 10.
Id. at 14.
CVM BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 105, at 33.
Id. at 40, 46.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 41.
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dence in capital markets, which is one of the CVM’s explicitly stated goals.
On the other hand, publicizing known market abuses might also encourage companies to take heed of the types of abuses they too should
internally monitor and to institute procedures that curb any such market
abuse. Intuitively, it makes sense that market abuse might be one of the
greatest threats posed by the Brazilian private equity industry. Corruption
is a persistent problem in Brazil. Transparency International’s 2012 corruption perceptions index ranked Brazil 69th out of 176 countries around
the world for perceived levels of public sector corruption.148 While data
on actual corruption is hard to gather, this suggests that many people believe that corruption persists in Brazil, which works in favor of increased
regulation to combat corruption and market abuses.
C. Private equity transactions can generate conflicts of interest risks and
these risks may be particularly salient in Brazil due to
high levels of corruption
Material conflicts of interest can pose risks to investor confidence in
capital markets when parties take on multiple roles in the same transaction or when a party engages in both advisory and proprietary activities.
For example, in management buy-outs, when management buys control of
the company, that management has both a fiduciary duty to current shareholders to recommend the highest sale price and a self-interested motive
to recommend the lowest sale price, leading to conflicts of interest.149
IOSCO found that conflicts of interest risks operate against its objectives
of increasing investor protection and promoting fair and efficient markets.150 The Technical Committee recommended further work to develop
principles for combating conflicts of interest in public-to-private and private-to-public private equity transactions insofar as those transactions
pose risk to public investors.151
The CVM also identified a “lack of practices designed to prevent and
manage conflicts of interest when these occur between funds and their directors or managers” as a risk event in its Biennial Report.152 As a result,
it recommended regular enforcement actions for investment funds generally to guard against conflicts of interest violations. Even though data related to these enforcement actions is unavailable, it is commendable that
the CVM has articulated its intention to focus on this potential risk area.
It is impossible, however, to conclude how effective the CVM has been at
actually guarding against potential conflicts of interest.
148. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L., http://www.transparen
cy.org/cpi2012/results (last visited March 20, 2013).
149.

IOSCO, supra note 133, at 10.

150.

Id. at 14-15.

151.

Id. at 18-19.

152.

CVM BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 105, at 47.
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D. Private equity can pose risks related to transparency and Brazil
should focus on mitigating these risks
Transparency risks may exist in private equity transactions, in spite of
the fact that private equity investors generally receive substantial disclosure from firms. Valuation and performance reporting varies across jurisdictions, which can make it hard for investors to compare investments and
optimize investment strategies and might undermine investor confidence
in private equity firms.153 IOSCO’s Private Equity Final Report found
that minimizing transparency risks were also relevant for the IOSCO
objectives of increasing investor protection and promoting fair and efficient markets.154 Additionally, the report emphasized that curbing such
risks should be an ongoing priority for both IOSCO and national regulators, but that additional IOSCO work related to transparency and private
equity was not necessary at the time of the report.155
In line with IOSCO’s recommendations, the CVM specifically identified transparency as a risk in its Biennial report. While no mention was
made of conformity with other jurisdiction’s valuation methods, the CVM
thought that “the availability of funds whose assets are valued in ways that
are not in conformity with the existing legislation or, when relevant, the
valuation standards set out in the fund’s regulation [the document establishing the fund]” was a risk.156 Again, it is hard to judge whether the
CVM is actually doing a reasonable job guarding against transparency
concerns. However, they have at least brought their stated regulatory
goals in line with those recommended by IOSCO, which is commendable.
E. Private equity may pose risks to overall market efficiency, but such
broad risks are difficult to define and regulate and Brazil
need not focus on these risks
Private equity can pose complex issues related to overall market efficiency. Arguably, private equity firms that take once publicly traded companies off market essentially enjoy the benefits of owning the company
during a high-growth period, which might otherwise be enjoyed by regular
investors if the company had remained public. Some jurisdictions could
suffer from having a large private equity market if the existence of such a
market undermines the quality of public markets.157 IOSCO found that
overall market efficiency risks did not fall within any of IOSCO’s mandates of risks to monitor158 and limited its recommendation to an observa153.

IOSCO, supra note 133, at 11.

154.

Id. at 15.

155.

Id. at 19.

156.

CVM BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 105, at 44.

157.

IOSCO, supra note 133, at 11.

158.

Id. at 15.
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tion that individual national public bodies might need to consider issues
related to market efficiency when designing regulatory policies.159
Unsurprisingly, the CVM did not identify any risks related to overall
market efficiency in its assessment of risks in its Biennial Report. Any
such generalized design question is better left to the Conselho Monetario
Nacional, Brazil’s norm-setting body that governs monetary policy generally. The internal discussions of this entity are not widely available, but it
is likely that Brazil’s regulators consider overall market efficiency while
designing their policies. Due to the broad and somewhat undefined nature
of this particular risk and the lack of information related to Brazil’s monetary policy-setting-body, I am unable to assess the adequacy of Brazilian
regulator’s efforts towards controlling general market efficiency, and such
an assessment is beyond the scope of this note.
F. Private equity may generate market access risks, but Brazil’s
regulators need not focus on these risks at this time
Even though most private equity transactions are limited to qualified
investors, market access problems may arise if private equity firms have
retail exposure through certain activities. For example, a private equity
firm might offer hybrid securities to retail investors in a given transaction.
IOSCO found that risks related to market access were relevant to
IOSCO’s objective of increasing investor protection,160 but that because
the number of retail investments in private equity funds is generally small
it was not appropriate to mandate additional work related to mitigating
this risk.161
Brazil’s regulators have not voiced any opinion on market access risks.
Research does not reveal any mechanisms by which Brazilian private equity firms would have exposure to a combination of both retail and private
investors. Assuming that such practices do not exist in Brazil, I conclude
that Brazil’s regulators need not be concerned about market access risks at
this time.
G. The private equity industry has the potential to pose systemic risks to
capital markets but does not pose such risks in Brazil at this time
Possibly the most important goal of financial regulation is to avoid the
concentration of risk in systemically important institutions which engage
in risky financial activities that—if they fail—threaten the integrity of the
financial system as a whole. This type of risk, systemic risk, has become a
pressing concern in light of the recent financial crisis.
Institutions may pose systemic risk if, when many of the institutions
investors attempt to redeem their investments simultaneously, there is a
“run” scenario and the institution is forced to conduct a fire sale to meet
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 12.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 20.
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its obligations. Commentators have argued that private equity funds do
not pose this type of systemic risk due to the long-term nature and illiquidity of the private equity investment. In Private Equity and its Regulation in
Europe, Jennifer Payne argues that private equity funds and hedge funds
are distinguishable in that hedge funds have the potential to cause credit
crunches while private equity funds do not.162 Hedge fund investors,
Payne explains, can cash in their investment with a 90-days notice. If a
large number of investors ask for redemptions at the same time, the fund
might be forced to sell companies in a down market to honor redemptions.
Private equity fund investors, on the other hand, may not withdraw their
capital before the fund matures, typically for a period of ten years, leading
to a reliance on long-term capital commitments as opposed to short-term
financing, and less susceptibility to runs.163 Like the U.S. and European
funds that Payne focuses on, Brazilian private equity funds are structured
as closed-end investments that investors cannot redeem at any time. A
typical investment horizon is about ten years. Accordingly, private equity
funds in Brazil are similarly protected from the runs associated with systemic risk.
Other commentators have stressed that the private equity industry
does not pose the traditional threats of systemic risk because investments
are long-term and illiquid. These commentators contrast private equity
funds with mutual funds, which contribute to systemic risk because investors may rapidly withdraw money if funds experience bad times. Commentators also stress the fact that private equity investments pose less
systemic risk because limited partner’s investments are not cross-collateralized, meaning that one form of collateral can be subject to multiple
interests.164
The Private Equity Industry in Brazil does not appear to pose the sorts
of systemic risk concerns that might be applicable in more developed private equity markets. Unlike the U.S. and European private equity markets, private equity deals in Brazil are financed almost exclusively through
equity, so there are no leverage concerns associated with systemic risk.
Moreover, Brazilian private equity funds are structured to avoid spontaneous funds redemptions by investors. Because private equity investments
are limited to specific types of “qualified” investors that accept the funds’
investment structures, there are fewer risks posed to normal retail investors.165 For these reasons, I conclude that Brazilian regulators need not
expend significant effort worrying about the systemic risks posed by private equity at this time.
162.

Payne, supra note 138, at 14.

163.

Id.

164. See Lapado Lawale Nicholas, Private Equity In a Deleveraged Economy: Lessons
From the Financial Crisis 13 (May 18, 2010) (unpublished student article on file with Harvard
Law School), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628948.
165.

Private Equity in Brazil, supra note 1, at 167.
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H. Private equity may theoretically pose risks to investors, even when
they are qualified, but Brazil’s level of investor protection
is probably adequate as-is
Brazil’s regulators appear to be only minimally concerned with investor protections for private equity investors, even though “qualified” investors may also need protection. The CVM has relatively simple procedures
for setting up a private equity fund, and provides little oversight of the
fund while it is operating. Only if a private equity funds attempt to exit
the strategic investment by taking the target company public does the
CVM step in and take a more active supervisory role. This begs the question: why is there so little day-to-day supervision of private equity funds?
The main rationale for imposing less oversight over the day-to-day operations of Brazil’s private equity funds is because investments in private
equity funds are limited to qualified investors. Qualified investors are ostensibly sophisticated and in less need of protection than “mom and pop”
investors, who are assumedly less financially savvy and in need of more
governmental protection. Investor protection costs money to both the enterprise (which must pay to ensure compliance) and the taxpayer (whose
taxes support rule-making and enforcement activities). Accordingly,
policymakers do not wish to impose extra costs on the system if there is
not a compelling reason to do so. The traditional “qualified investor vs.
mom and pop investor” rationale for not regulating private equity fund
activity rests on several assumptions that may be questioned.
First, a policy of less oversight over investments made by qualified investors assumes that possession of a certain amount of money (in Brazil’s
case a $100,000 reais investment and $300,000 reais in other investments)
automatically makes a person or company a sophisticated investor in need
of less protection.166 However, wealth may not be a particularly good
proxy for ability to assess financial risk. In Brazil, wealth is frequently
passed from generation to generation through close family relationships,
but financial savvy may not always be transferred from parent to child.
Furthermore, using a high threshold of wealth as proxy for need of protection may underestimate the financial savvy of less wealthy Brazilian investors, imposing regulatory costs on the system that are inefficient. With
numerous scholarship programs that allow poor Brazilians to pursue
higher education, it is conceivable that many recent graduates are able to
understand financial risk without making the cutoff of qualified investors.
In addition, as with any bright line test, it is possible to question whether
the line for “qualified” investors was drawn in the appropriate place—for
example, why not decline to protect those who invest $75,000 reais?
All of these criticisms may be largely theoretical. Intuitively, financial
savvy and need for protection probably is—in most cases—strongly correlated to wealth and quantity of investments. While different “cut-off”
166.
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points are certainly possible, $100,000 reais is probably a decent predictor
an investor’s general ability to fend for himself. On the other hand, the
rapid evolution of financial products may mean that even those investors
that are particularly wealthy are in need of extra investor protection due
to the complex nature of the transactions they undertake. In the U.S., the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found ample evidence that the investors involved in buying and selling complex financial instruments like Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and “CDO-squared” instruments,
had very little understanding of the actual nature or underlying risks associated with those products.167 These findings raise important questions
about the traditional justifications for having two tiers of oversight for investors. Notably, CVM instruction 391 specifically limits a FIPs ability to
invest in derivatives, with the exception of hedging against its own risks.168
This limitation appears to be a step in the right direction towards protecting all investors, regardless of qualifications, when very complex financial
instruments are involved. Overall, the amount of investor protection imposed by Brazilian regulators is a good thing. Given the important limitation on FIPs ability to invest in derivatives, even “qualified” investors are
protected on some level, and imposing additional layers of investor protection would probably stifle growth in a high-growth, productive industry
that (as already concluded) does not impose systemic risk to Brazil’s financial system overall.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this note, I analyzed the policy choices that arise from the growth of
Brazil’s private equity market and questions Brazil’s regulators must confront as they decide how to handle this increasingly important industry. I
concluded that the Brazilian government should play a role in actively encouraging private equity in Brazil. After looking at several market factors,
I concluded that Brazil has already started to encourage demand and supply for private equity funds. Notably, however, the government could encourage more private equity investment by reducing crippling interest
rates, investing more in research and development, and easing the regulatory burdens associated with filing patent applications. I concluded that
Brazil should take an active stance in regulating its growing industry, and
that the CVM’s “hands off” approach to regulation and the heavy reliance
on self-regulatory agencies alone are probably insufficient to handle private equity regulation in the future. ANBIMA and ABVCAP, the authors of the new “Self-Regulatory Code” for private equity firms, and
BM&FBOVESPA, the São Paulo Stock Exchange, have all made promising steps towards improving the regulatory climate in Brazil, but are too
167. See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT,
xxiv, 8 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
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riddled with conflicts of interest to stand alone as reliable independent
regulators.
I found that some of the traditional risks posed by private equity, such
as systemic risk, caused by high levels of leverage, are non-existent in Brazil at this time, because private equity deals in Brazil are financed almost
exclusively with equity. Accordingly, I concluded that Brazil’s national
regulators need not worry about these risks unless the price of debt comes
down and leverage increases. Instead, Brazilian regulators should focus
on risks related to market abuse, conflicts of interest, and transparency, as
these may be more salient in a country with high levels of corruption.
Brazil should celebrate the recent growth and success of its nascent
private equity industry, and should take steps to allow private equity to
flourish in the future. Reducing interest rates, increasing the predictability
of the judiciary and the quality and accountability of regulators are first
steps to making sure that private equity’s future in Brazil remains bright.
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